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For I say to you in all sadness of conviction that to think great thoughts
you must be heroes as well as idealists. Only when you have worked
alone—when you have felt around you a black gulf of solitude more
isolating than that which surrounds the dying man, and in hope and in
despair have trusted to your own unshaken will—then only will you have
achieved. Thus only can you gain the secret isolated joy of the thinker,
who knows that, a hundred years after he is dead and forgotten, men who
never heard of him will be moving to the measure of his thought.
MR. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.2
1

Associate, Sidley & Austin. J.D., University of Chicago, 2000; M.Acct. Southern Illinois
University at Carbondale, 1993; B.S. Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, 1992; CPA,
1992. This article has benefited greatly from the comments and (mostly constructive)
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writing this article. Thank you!
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RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES,
JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., 220 (1996)
(from a lecture delivered to the undergraduates of Harvard University on February 17, 1886).
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Meet Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. “He is philosopher become king.”3
Seventy-five years ago, he plotted a constitutional path that, while crooked, most
contemporary jurists have been willing to travel—at least partially. He accepted a
restrictive notion of economic freedoms, such as freedom of contract,4 but later
rejected a restrictive notion of non-economic freedoms, such as freedom of speech.5
This path is not only crooked. It is also paradoxical: citizens are free to say what
they want, but the States—the political institutions best able to listen—are powerless
to act if the federal government has enacted what it believes is a better idea. That
may be the end-result, but only if that is the end of the path. As the Supreme Court
has only recently begun to realize, however, it is not.
This article analyzes the last turn in Justice Holmes’s constitutionally crooked
path, largely by penetrating to the very core of the Supreme Court’s recent decision
in Alden v. Maine.6 In this case, the Court upheld the Maine State courts’ dismissal
of a federal private right of action against a non-consenting State, the Supremacy
Clause itself notwithstanding. Alden resolves, albeit only partially, a fundamental
issue that strikes at the heart of our coordinate system of government: whether a nonconsenting State is absolutely immune from suit in any state court if the right of
action arises under a federal law that is properly within the constitutional ambit of
Congress’s regulatory authority. It is hard to believe that this basic issue has been
lying in wait for more than 200 years, but it has, and so it is not surprising that this
case unearths some of the weightiest issues federalism and federal jurisdiction have
to offer. It necessitates a theory of the Tenth Amendment that accords with the
Supremacy Clause; it questions the outer jurisdictional limits of our legislative
courts; and it casts considerable doubt on the obligatory nature of concurrent state
court jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, the Alden decision is woefully inadequate, as it offers virtually no
guidance in dealing with these issues.7 So by analyzing and reconciling these issues,
this article hopefully fills the void, for deep below the surface there is, indeed, a
cohesive and consistent theory of federalism: the Commerce Clause gives Congress
the power to regulate the inner-workings of the States, but the Tenth Amendment
evidences the States the exclusive power to regulate the jurisdiction of their own
courts. Put more broadly, Congress can regulate the States to practically no end, but
if Congress believes its laws are economically sound, then it must incur the judicial
and, at times, prosecutorial resources to enforce them, or persuade (but not coerce)
the state legislatures to do the same.
3
PHILIP B. KURLAND, FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT: EXTRAJUDICIAL
ESSAYS ON THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 122 (1970).
4

See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-75 (1905) (Holmes J., dissenting).

5

See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes J., dissenting).

6

Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).

7

Commentators, moreover, are equally perplexed. See, e.g., The Supreme Court: Foot on
Brake, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 22-28, 2000, at 32 (quoting Professor Douglas Kmiec: the
Justices “know what direction they want to go in, but I don’t think they yet have a theory to
guide them.”). If the Supreme Court has not yet found this guiding theory, if nothing else, this
article surely offers one.
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This is Justice Holmes’s “jurisdictional stopgap.” But to fully appreciate its
vigor requires a much fuller understanding of the road that has been traveled thus far.
So with that end in mind, our first stop is the Commerce Clause. A judicial forum,
after all, is but an empty plate if the claim against the State is itself unconstitutional.
Part I therefore traces the Court’s waffling attitude towards the division of regulatory
power between the state and federal governments. Then, against this backdrop, Part
II takes the jurisdictional turn by analyzing the Court’s most recent attempt to
resuscitate the Tenth Amendment’s check on Congress’s Commerce Power. To
sharpen the focus, much of this article will focus on the Fair Labor Standards Act, a
federal statute that always seems to sit at the center of the Court’s federalism storm.
I. CONGRESS’S (IN)ABILITY TO REGULATE THE STATES’ INTERNAL AFFAIRS
No one can argue that the Fair Labor Standards Act [FLSA]8 does not best
exemplify the Court’s near-schizophrenic attitude towards the division of power
between the federal and state governments. For not only is the FLSA a by-product
of the “switch in time” that supposedly “saved the Nine,” but its divisive antecedents
and its rich history summon most of the issues and arguments that have persisted to
today.
A. Before the New Deal
9

In 1916, for example, Congress passed the federal Child Labor Act, which
prohibited the interstate or foreign transportation of certain products. Two years
later, in a five-to-four decision, the Court struck this law down in Hammer v.
Dagenhart.10 The thrust of the Court’s disagreement turned on the Tenth
Amendment’s check on Congress’s regulative power. Does the Tenth Amendment
impose a limitation on Congress’s expressly11 enumerated powers just as the First

8

See 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq.

9

For just a sampling of decisions that have considered the constitutionality of Congress’s
authority to regulate distinct segments of the labor force, see Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. ICC,
221 U.S. 612 (1911) (prohibiting a maximum number of hours in the interstate railway
industry); A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating
the NIRA’s “Live Poultry Code”); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)
(invalidating the NIRA’s Petroleum Code).
10

Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).

11

During the first session of Congress, Representative Tucker proposed that the States
retain all of the powers not “expressly” delegated to the federal government, so that the Tenth
Amendment would read “the powers not expressly delegated to the United States by the
Constitution,” (emphasis added) but the federalist controlled Congress rejected this proposal
stating that such a limitation “was one of the great defects” of the Articles of Confederation.
See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, §§ 190001, 752-54 (1833); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST
PERIOD 1789-1801 112 n.443 (1997). Despite this clear refutation, however, the majority
opinion in Hammer slipped the word “expressly” into its reiteration of the Tenth Amendment,
as did the authority upon which it relied: “[T]he powers not expressly delegated to the national
government are reserved.” (emphasis added) (citing Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
71, 76 (1868), which noted that the States retain “all powers not expressly delegated to the
national government.”) (emphasis added).
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Amendment does and, if so, to what extent? Or is the Tenth Amendment merely a
tautology?
The majority favored the former interpretation, and Justice Holmes dissented in
favor of the latter. First, the majority distinguished a number of prior decisions that
upheld a number of federal regulatory statutes on the ground that those statutes,
unlike the Child Labor Act, attacked an inherently evil activity or product.12 While
employing children under certain circumstances is no doubt evil, the degree to which
such employment is prohibited is arguably not. All of the States had already
regulated this purely local activity. Thus, prohibiting the transportation of those
products that failed to comply with these more exacting federal requirements, the
Court held, was tantamount to “requir[ing] the states to exercise their police
power.”13 Although the state and federal laws clashed with one another, the Court
nonetheless did not believe that the Supremacy Clause should prevail. This is
because the States’ enactment of “such laws as seem wise to the local authority is
inherent and has never been surrendered to the general government.”14 Thus the
Court invalidated the Child Labor Act, holding that it unconstitutionally impinged
the States’ regulatory prerogative.
Writing for the dissent, Justice Holmes agreed that the state legislatures retained
the authority to regulate the working conditions of the labor force, but he disagreed
with the majority’s conclusion that Congress’s exclusive authority over interstate
commerce could not indirectly alter those laws.15 In other words, the federal
judiciary could not prohibit Congress from accomplishing indirectly what it could
not accomplish directly. Any relief, he argued, is only available if “placed there by
congressional action.”16 Consider Standard Oil v. United States,17 where the Court
upheld the use of the Commerce Clause to break up monopolies, even though the
Sherman Act indirectly interfered with the States’ exclusive control over their
intrastate manufacturing activities.18 So in Justice Holmes’s mind, the collateral
effect the Commerce Clause has on the Tenth Amendment is a necessary
consequence of the application of the Supremacy Clause; and the availability of any
relief from this result necessarily redounds to the national political process.

12
So that no one could misunderstand why these prior decisions were distinguishable, the
Court quoted its reasoning for upholding the Mann Act in Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308
(1913):
If the facility of interstate transportation can be taken away from the demoralization of
lotteries, the debasement of obscene literature, the contagion of diseased cattle or
persons, the impurity of food and drugs, the like facility can be taken away from the
systematic enticement to, and the enslavement in prostitution and debauchery of
women, and, more insistently, of girls.
Id. at 322.
13

Id. at 276.

14

Id. at 275.

15

Id. at 277.

16

Hoke, 227 U.S. at 280 (quoting Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 108 (1890)).

17

221 U.S. 1, 68-69 (1912).

18

See Hammer, 247 U.S. at 279.
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The essence of the Court’s disagreement, then, boiled down to whether the Tenth
Amendment (or the Constitution as a whole) implicitly embodies any core regulatory
activities that are wholly immune from federal intrusion, not whether the States had
already regulated those activities. If the unconstitutionality of a federal statute
depended on the existence of an overlapping state statute, the Tenth Amendment
would essentially embody a reverse Supremacy Clause. That is, Congress could
indirectly regulate purely local matters only so long as the state legislatures had not.
While this wild animal may sound perverse, the majority actually took it one step
further, holding that the Tenth Amendment embodies something of a reverse
negative Commerce Clause.19
Just two months after the Hammer decision, Congress tried again. This time it
enacted the Child Labor Tax Law of 1919,20 which, as its name gives away, taxed the
profits generated from the use of this purportedly evil activity; otherwise it was
essentially identical to the Child Labor Act of 1916. It never stood a chance. We
would have “to be blind,” the Court blistered, “not to see that the so-called tax [was]
imposed to stop the employment of children.”21
During the next term, however, the Court encouraged Congress to take a different
path, one that has proved to this day virtually impervious to constitutional attack. In
Massachusetts v. Mellon,22 the State of Massachusetts argued that the federal
Maternity Act, which provided the States with federal grants so long as they
complied with the statute’s mandate, violated the Tenth Amendment because it
induced the States into ceding a portion of their sovereignty over to the federal
government. Not true, this statute, the Court held, did not “require the states to do,
or to yield anything,” it merely gave them the option to do so.23 So even if this
statute violated the Constitution, since it did not actually or potentially invade the
States’ sovereignty, the States had no standing; and without standing, the outcome
again depended on the national political process.24
B. During and After the New Deal
The foregoing negative “activism” incensed President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In
a radio address on March 9, 1937, he announced that his court-packing plan was
necessary to “save our National Constitution from hardening of the judicial
arteries.”25 Coincidentally(?), just three weeks later the Court abandoned its
interventionist course; and for the next 34 years, deference to congressional
19

Though alien to contemporary ideology, it does appear that the majority floated such an
idea: “The maintenance of the authority of the States over matters purely local is as essential
to the preservation of our institutions as is the conservation of the supremacy of the federal
power in all matters entrusted to the nation by the federal Constitution.” Id. at 275.
20

See Tax on Employment of Child Labor of 1919, 40 Stat. 1057, 1138 (1919), amended
by Revenue Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 227, 306 (Title XII 1921).
21

Bailey v. Drexel, 259 U.S. 20, 37 (1922).

22

Mass. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).

23

Id. at 482.

24

Id. at 489.

25

GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 129-30 (11th ed. 1985).
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intrusions reigned supreme.26 Congress seized this opportunity by enacting the
FLSA in 1938, which, as then worded, only applied to private employers. The
following year,27 Justice Holmes’s “powerful and now classic dissent”28 in Hammer
gained currency and ultimately won sway with the Court in 1941.
In United States v. Darby,29 Justice Stone delivered the unanimous Court’s
requiem for the Tenth Amendment, first putting to rest any idea of a reverse
Supremacy Clause, and then interpreting the Tenth Amendment out of existence.
Just because the Commerce Clause may preclude a State’s regulation of an interstate
activity, even if Congress has not regulated that activity,30 the Court held, does not
mean that Congress can not regulate an intrastate activity on a subject a State has
already regulated, so long as the federal regulation substantially affects interstate
commerce. Of course the Commerce Clause has its limits, the Court continued, but
only to the extent the Constitution specifically and substantively provides.31 As for
the Tenth Amendment, it provides nothing, for it merely reaffirms that which the
enumeration of powers implies—namely, that those powers which are not conferred
are retained. The Tenth Amendment is therefore “but a truism.”32 Thus, Congress

26
See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overruling Adkins v.
Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), and upholding a state minimum wage law for women).
It may be perilous to assume that President Roosevelt intimidated the Court into submission,
for Justice Roberts voted on December 19, 1936, well before President Roosevelt even
announced his court-packing plan. See PHILIP B. KURLAND, FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE
SUPREME COURT: EXTRAJUDICIAL ESSAYS ON THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 518 (1970)
(“It is one of the most ludicrous illustrations of the power of lazy repetition of uncritical talk
that a judge with the character of Roberts should have attributed to him a change of judicial
views out of deference to political considerations.”); but see Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told
Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARV. L. REV. 620 (1994) (arguing that Justice Frankfurter actually
rewrote the history of Roosevelt’s court-packing plan in order to lessen the incessant scrutiny
that was being leveled against the Court’s holding in Brown v. Bd. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483
(1954)).
27

See, e.g., Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 47 (1939) (citing the authority weakly
distinguished in Hammer, the Court held that Congress may regulate the interstate commerce
of intrastate activities to the vanishing point).
28

United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941).

29

See id.

30

Even the vitality of this so-called “negative” or “dormant” Commerce Clause has
recently been put into play. See Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 78-79
(1993) (Scalia J., concurring) (“[T]he Commerce Clause contains no ‘negative’ component, no
self-operative prohibition upon the States’ regulation of commerce,” though prior precedents
may still be upheld).
31

Id. at 116.

32

Id. at 124. Whether the Tenth Amendment is a truism, or even a tautology, see New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992), depends on your view of the foundation
of the constitutional plan. Surely you cannot both give and retain the same power, but the
Tenth Amendment does not explicitly say who gave the power in the first place. If the people
were the parties to this “new” Constitution, then the Tenth Amendment actually “reserved to
the States” the powers the people did not reserve to themselves or delegate to the federal
government. Under this assumption of the constitutional plan, the Tenth Amendment is not a
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may prescribe a national minimum wage because labor conditions substantially
affect interstate commerce;33 and since Congress can constitutionally impose this
primary obligation, the Court further held that it can likewise impose any such
“incidental . . . means of enforcing” it.34
No doubt emboldened by the Court’s considerable deference, Congress further
extended the FLSA’s coverage, first to employees of public schools and hospitals in
1966, and then to virtually all state governmental employees in 1974.35 In Maryland
v. Wirtz,36 twenty-eight States joined together in attacking the 1966 amendments,
arguing that its constitutionality would usher in “the utter destruction of the state[s]
as . . . sovereign political entit[ies].” 37 But such an apocalyptic prediction, the Court
chimed, is simply not tenable. The FLSA does not “tell the States how to perform
[their] medical and educational functions,” it just tells them the minimum amount
such services is worth.38 Since a public hospital or a school’s activities obviously
affect interstate commerce, the Court found no justification for distinguishing
between a State’s governmental and proprietary functions and thus upheld the 1966
amendment.39
Congress’s victory in Wirtz, however, turned to defeat in National League of
Cities v. Usery.40 Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion for a rancorously
divided Court. It is one thing, the Court held, for Congress to regulate the maximum
hours and minimum dollars that a private employer can pay its employees, but it is
quite another thing to impose those same restrictions on a state employer.41 Unlike
redundancy, because it does not say that the States retained those powers they did not give to
the federal government.
33
To just briefly veer down a policy lane, the States, not the federal government, are
plainly in a better position to determine what impact a minimum wage will have on the widely
varying commercial communities within their borders.
Perhaps these experimental
“laboratories” might even discover that the problem is actually in the medicine the federal
government prescribes. See New State Ice. Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis J., dissenting) (advancing the idea that the States should operate as “laboratories” of
trial and error).
34

Darby, 312 U.S. at 124-25.

35

A narrow band of employees remain exempt. Section 213(a)(1) excepts, for example,
professional employees from the FLSA’s overtime provisions. And it is this professional
employee exclusion that precipitated the Court’s decision in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706
(1999). See Part II, infra.
36

Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).

37

Id. at 196.

38

Id. at 193-94. The three-headed district court that initially heard this case exposed the
obvious weakness in this argument. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 269 F. Supp. 826, 849 (Md. 1967)
(pointing out that the power to regulate can be just as destructive as the power to tax).
39
Seemingly troubled by the potentially crippling effect this decision could have on the
States’ autonomy, the Court took the unusual step of reserving judgment on a related Eleventh
Amendment issue. See Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 200.
40

National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).

41

Id. at 845.
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the private sector, the States constitute a coordinate part of our constitutional system
of government.42 The Tenth Amendment, though it has been characterized as a
truism, is none the less an “express”43 declaration of “the constitutional policy that
Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States’ integrity or
their ability to function effectively in a federal system.”44
The Court then held that both the 1966 and the 1974 amendments to the FLSA
impose significant burdens on the States, displace their policy-making decisions and
thereby “have the effect of coercing the States” into relinquishing, taxing, or at least
reducing their “traditional governmental functions,” such as police and fire
protection.45 In so holding, the Court overruled Wirtz but left intact Darby and the
long line of decisions upholding Congress’s plenary power to regulate private
interstate and foreign commerce.
Justice Brennan’s stinging dissent resonated with so much enmity that, at times,
it practically defied credibility.
He roundly condemned the majority for
manufacturing an “abstraction without substance,”46 and one that will surely
“astound scholars of the Constitution,”47 because it is entirely devoid of
constitutional support—either from the text of the Constitution or from the Court’s
150+ years of precedent. It was this “overly restrictive” view of the Commerce
Clause, he reminded the majority, that not only provoked the “constitutional crisis”
of the 1930s, but also nearly destroyed the institutional integrity of the judicial
branch.48 The dissent then went on to extol the virtues of the national political
process, arguing that the States are adequately represented at the national level, and
that the political process is therefore the only effective means of safeguarding the
States’ sovereignty.49 Anything more, the dissent concluded, is nothing less than a
“catastrophic judicial body blow [to] Congress’ power under the Commerce
Clause.”50
42

Id. at 848-49.

43

That the Tenth Amendment expressly declares a “policy” that restricts the Commerce
Clause is but a roundabout way of saying the Tenth Amendment itself “expressly” restricts the
Commerce Clause. Yet, in the prior term, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the Tenth
Amendment did not restrict the Commerce Clause “by its terms.” See Fry v. United States,
421 U.S. 542, 557 (1975); see also William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution,
54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 694 (1976) (approving Justice Holmes’s opinion in Missouri v. Holland,
252 U.S. 416 (1920)).
44

Usery, 426 U.S. at 843 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)).

45

Id. at 850, 852.

46

Id. at 860.

47

Id. at 862.

48

Id. at 868.

49

Usery, 426 U.S. at 857, 876; see also Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
50
Usery, 426 U.S. at 880. Despite the dissent’s polemic, it nonetheless acknowledged that
Congress could readily achieve its objectives through the use of conditional grants; and in so
saying, it conceded the limited practical effect the majority’s holding would actually have on
the division of power. Id. at 878.
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It is far from clear why the Court overruled Wirtz but not Darby. The majority
tried to reconcile these two cases by pointing to an unavailing, question-begging
distinction: “A State is not merely a factor in the ‘shifting economic arrangements’
of the private sector of the economy, . . . but is itself a coordinate element in the
system established by the Framers for governing our Federal Union.”51 While this
distinction is undeniably true, it fails to explain why, on the one hand, the federal
government can displace the States’ ability to regulate the private sector, but, on the
other hand, it cannot displace the States’ ability to regulate certain “traditional
governmental functions.” After all, if the Constitution protects certain core
activities, then would one not expect to find the legislative function—a (if not the)
quintessential function of a State’s sovereignty—at the top of the list? Hospitals, fire
fighters, sanitation, public health, and all of the other functions the Court pegged to
the “essentials” of state sovereignty can be carried out by the private sector, but the
States’ legislative function cannot. What can be more “essential” to the States’
sovereignty than those very functions the private sector cannot perform?
Because of these difficulties, as well as the elusive nature of this essentialfunction test, the demise of National League of Cities seemed almost inevitable.
After a series of decisions that refined but consistently rejected the applicability of
this essential-function test,52 the Court finally gave up in 1985 and overruled
National League of Cities. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority,53 the Court was asked to consider whether a municipally-owned mass
transit system constituted a traditional governmental function, and was thereby
immune from the FLSA’s mandate. Justice Blackmun, writing for the five member
majority, four of whom dissented in National League of Cities, concluded that such
an inquiry is bankrupt: it is “unsound in principle and unworkable in practice.”54
States are sovereign to the extent their powers are not vested in the federal
government, but the Tenth Amendment, the Court then believed, “offers no guidance
about where the frontier between state and federal power lies.”55 Thus relying on
Professor Wechsler’s seminal work on judicial review,56 the Court held that the
States’ primary protection from federal interference resides in the political process.
The dissent denounced the majority’s wholesale abandonment of the Court’s
unique role in determining the constitutional status of the States’ sovereignty. The
majority offers no explanation, the dissent argued, why the principles of the Court’s
most famous case, Marbury v. Madison, are somehow no longer applicable to the

51

Id. at 849.

52

See, e.g., Holdel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981)
(reformulating National League of Cities into a three-part test); United Transportation Union
v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982) (rejecting a state autonomy challenge to the
Railway Labor Act); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (rejecting a state autonomy
challenge to the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act).
53

Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Hous. Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).

54

Id. at 546.

55

Id. at 550.

56

See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 542 (1954).
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Court’s role in supervising Congress’s regulation of the States.57 The dissent also
objected to the majority’s statement that the States would retain some degree of
sovereignty. It lacks credibility, the dissent asserted, because the majority has not
indicated a single aspect of the States’ sovereignty that “would remain when the
Commerce Clause is invoked to justify federal regulation.”58 Indeed, by overruling
National League of Cities and reaffirming Wirtz, “all that stands between the
remaining essentials of state sovereignty and Congress” Justice O’Connor
concluded, “is the latter’s underdeveloped capacity for self-restraint.”59 Finally,
Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor confidently predicted that the constitutional status
of federalism would “in time again command the support of a majority of this
Court.”60 How prophetic indeed!
II. THE STATE SOVEREIGNTY JURISDICTIONAL STOPGAP
A. Charting the Course
Justice Brennan’s resignation in the summer of 1990—if not Justice Rehnquist’s
elevation to the Chief Justice post in 1986—signaled yet another shift in the Court’s
ever-elusive conception of constitutional federalism.61 This time, however, in
contrast to National League of Cities v. Usery,62 the Court gradually yet
systematically reconstructed a protective sphere of state autonomy. Indeed, what
started out as a distant rumble, a mere prediction,63 has recently materialized into a
variegated attack on Congress’s ability to regulate State activities.
At first, the Court moved with some degree of caution, adopting what Professor
Shapiro has called a “sub-constitutional”64 insistence on congressional
accountability: States cannot fend for themselves in the national political process if

57

469 U.S. 557 (Powell, J., dissenting).

58

Id. at 581.

59

Id. at 588.

60

Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also id. at 589 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

61

A similar shift in ideology has occurred in both the Executive and Legislative branches.
In 1993, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993), and in
1995, Congress enacted the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq., both of
which evince a heightened concern for state autonomy. Executive Order 12,866 requires
federal agencies to consult with state officials before promulgating any regulations that may
affect the States’ autonomy; and the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act restricts Congress’s
ability to regulate certain federally assisted state activities.
62

426 U.S. 833 (1976).

63
See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580, 589; William H. Rehnquist, Welcoming Remarks: National
Conference on State-Federal Judicial Relationships 78 VA. L. REV. 1657, 1660 (1992)
(“Circumstances have changed, and the nation can no longer afford the luxury of state and
federal systems that work at cross-purposes or that irrationally duplicate each others’
efforts.”).
64

See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 64, 71, 118 (1995).
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the magnitude of the federal intrusion is not readily apparent.65 So now before
Congress can legislate away the States’ autonomy, its intention to do so must be
perfectly plain. This substantive cannon of construction,66 ingeniously linked to the
Court’s justification for overruling National League of Cities, was then aggressively
employed in strengthening the States’ interests under the Tenth, Eleventh, and
Fourteenth Amendments. However, the Court did not truly turn the corner until its
landmark decision in New York v. United States.67 There, for the first time since
1976, the Court severed and then struck down a portion of a federal statute,
ironically on the ground that it coerced the state legislature, and thereby infringed the
state political process.68
Caution gave way in 1995, and with it, the Supreme Court has since overthrown
a number of intrusive federal statutes with almost annual regularity. In United States
v. Lopez,69 the Court awoke from its dogmatic slumber, and, for the first time in
nearly sixty years,70 struck down a federal statute that regulated a private activity
under the Commerce Clause. In 1996, Seminole Tribe of Fla v. Florida71 put a
partial end to Congress’s ability under the Commerce Clause to abrogate the States’
sovereign immunity in federal court, thereby channeling future congressional
incursions into the civil war amendments. And in 1997, the Court extended and
strengthened its holding in New York by invalidating yet another federal statute, this
time on the ground that it compelled state officials to implement and enforce a
federal regulatory scheme.72
Largely untouched during this state sovereignty spree was the seminal decision of
Testa v. Katt,73 where the Court seemingly held the state judiciary has an obligation
to adjudicate concurrent federal question claims. Few questioned Testa’s continuing
viability—few, that is, until now.
B. The Jurisdictional Turn
So the Court’s latest reformulation of federalism began well before Seminole
Tribe, but the Court’s logical and, indeed, sensible holding in Alden v. Maine has

65
See, e.g., Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989) (refusing to subject a State to suit in
federal court unless the statute plainly shows a congressional intent to do so); Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (holding that a State’s mandatory retirement requirement
applies to state appointed judges because the ADEA does not expressly prohibit it).
66
See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 405 (1989).
67

505 U.S. 144 (1992).

68

See id. at 168-69. This is ironic because, until 1992, the last decision that invalidated a
federal statute was itself invalidated in 1985; and the reversal of that case, National League of
Cities, was based on respect for the federal political process.
69

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).

70

See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).

71

Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).

72

See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).

73

330 U.S. 386 (1947).
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clearly been in progress since then. Alden may very well mark the beginning of a
constitutional epoch. For not only has the issue in Alden been simmering for more
than 200 years, but it also lies at the very root of our coordinate system of
government: Is a non-consenting State absolutely immune from suit in any state
court if the right of action arises under a federal law that is properly within
Congress’s regulatory authority? Alden only answers a piece of this question. The
most restrictive (from the States’ point of view) reading of Alden yields symmetry:
A non-consenting State is immune from suit in its own courts if, and to the same
extent, it is immune from suit in the federal courts. Yet it is doubtful that that is
what the Court actually intended to say. About all that is clear is the precise holding
of the case, namely, that a State is constitutionally immune from any Article I private
right of action that is brought in a State’s own courts.74
Beyond that, however, the Court offers no guidance. What about the
counterfactual: is a non-consenting State subject to suit in its own courts to the same
extent that it is subject to suit in the federal courts? If, for example, Congress
successfully abrogates the States’ immunity from federal suit, has it likewise
abrogated the States’ immunity from suit in their own courts? To what extent, if any,
will the state courts remain open if Congress cannot abrogate the States’ sovereign
immunity? For example, may the United States bring an action against a nonconsenting State in its own courts? Does an Ex parte Young75 action pierce a State’s
immunity from suit in its own courts?76 Are municipalities not immune from suit in
their State’s own courts? Finally, is there any doctrinally consistent answer to all of
these questions in light of the Court’s failure to confront its holding in Testa v. Katt,
the seminal case concerning the state courts’ constitutional obligation to adjudicate
federal question claims. These questions—and their seemingly elusive answers—are
the focus of the following section of this article. Surprisingly, the answers to these
questions lie not in the Alden opinion itself, which is cemented on a rather shaky

74

Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999).

75

Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

76

Without reflection, these questions may seem nonsensical. If a litigant has the option of
suing a State in either state or federal court, the choice is obvious. But therein lies the rub. A
litigant may soon not have any choice in the matter. Indeed, Congress may attempt to stave
off the federal courts’ ever-expanding docket by enacting statutory restrictions on the
accessibility of the federal judiciary. Though a whole host of options are available, the
following illustrate the point: Congress could (1) reinstate the federal question “jurisdictional
amount” for cases brought in federal (but not state) courts; (2) enact a so-called “reverse
removal” device, whereby a federal court (or a multi-district panel) could transfer related cases
to the state courts for consolidation and adjudication; (3) confer, for certain causes of action,
exclusive state court federal question jurisdiction; or (4) cap the maximum number of Article
III judges that may be appointed. See generally William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass
Darkly: The Future of the Federal Courts, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1 (1993); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES: LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 23-39 (1995); Joan
Steinman, Reverse Removal, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1029, 1033-36 (1993). Since some, though
perhaps not all, of these options are no doubt constitutionally permissible, the state courts may
well find themselves saddled with federal question claims that constitutionally can—but
statutorily cannot—be adjudicated in the federal courts. Thus obvious gains may result from
this inquiry, that is, from exploring the States’ constitutionally protected jurisdictional
sovereignty.
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foundation, but rather in the Court’s prior holdings, which paradoxically includes
Testa. What follows, then, is a brief summary of the Alden decision, followed by an
in depth analysis of several of the Court’s prior holdings.
C. Alden, et al. vs. The State of Maine77
After Garcia, the FLSA once again took hold in the State of Maine, although not
entirely.78 Maine decided that its probation officers were not eligible for overtime
pay because they were “professional employees” within the meaning of
§ 213(a)(1).79 The probation officers thought otherwise, however, and brought suit
against Maine in federal court.80 The district court held in favor of the probation
officers, resulting in Maine’s compliance with the FLSA’s overtime provisions.81
However, while a special master was calculating the back-pay judgment, the
Supreme Court decided Seminole Tribe, which held that a non-consenting State is
immune from suit in federal court if the statute giving rise to the private right of
action was based on Congress’s Commerce Power.82 In light of that decision, the
district court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit affirmed.83
The probation officers did not seek Supreme Court review at that time, nor would
it have been fruitful had they done so. This is because the federal courts have
uniformly held that the FLSA’s wage and overtime provisions are exclusively
bottomed on the Commerce Clause.
Thus, even though the FLSA now
unequivocally subjects the States to suit—in both the federal and state courts—the
federal courts have unanimously held that Seminole Tribe thwarts Congress’s ability
to subject the States to an FLSA suit in federal court.84 So it is not surprising that
instead of seeking Supreme Court review, the probation officers turned to Maine’s
state courts, although this too proved unavailing. In a terse opinion, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine affirmed the Maine Superior Court’s dismissal, holding that
a State’s immunity from suit in the state courts is coextensive with its immunity from
suit in the federal courts.85

77

527 U.S. 706 (1999).

78

See Blackie v. Maine, 75 F.3d 716, 719 (1st Cir. 1996).

79

See id. at 719-20.

80

See Mills v. Maine, 839 F. Supp. 3 (D. Me. 1993).

81

See Alden v. Maine, No. 98-436, 1999 WL 66190 at * 3 (U.S. Me. Resp. Brief Feb. 11,
1999). Because the probation officers only sought to recover their back-pay, an Ex parte
Young action was not available.
82

See Mills v. State, No. 92-410-P-H, 1996 WL 400510 (D. Me. July 3, 1996).

83

See Mills v. State of Maine, 118 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 1997).

84

See Abril v. Virginia, 145 F.3d 182, 186-89 (4th Cir. 1998); Aaron v. Kansas, 115 F.3d
813, 817 (10th Cir. 1997); Raper v. Iowa, 115 F.3d 623, 624 (8th Cir. 1997); Wilson-Jones v.
Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 206-11 (6th Cir. 1997), modified on other grounds, 107 F.3d 358
(1998).
85

See Alden v. State, 715 A.2d 172, 174 (Me. 1998).
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari on June 23, 1999, and in another 5-to-4
decision affirmed the state courts’ dismissal and invalidated the FLSA’s
jurisdictional grant.86 The Court’s sovereign immunity decisions often cling to an
historical analysis of the ratification and adoption of the Constitution in general and
its Eleventh Amendment in particular. Such constitutional questions, as is also so
often the case, are soaked in controversy. Alden—in both respects—is no exception.
The opinion begins with the undeniable: The Constitution preserves to the States
the dignity, though not the full authority, of a sovereign nation.87 From there, the
Court reasoned that sovereign immunity has generally been a fundamental aspect of
the States’ sovereignty; that the Eleventh Amendment confirmed rather than
established the States’ sovereign immunity; and that the scope of this immunity is
defined not by the text of the Eleventh Amendment but by the “fundamental
postulates” that are implicit in the structure of the Constitution.88 In support of the
these points, the Court considered the States’ reaction to its holding in Chisholm v.
Georgia,89 a case that unquestionably triggered the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment.90 In Chisholm, the Court held that Article III’s grant of jurisdiction
over controversies “between a State and Citizens of another State” empowered the
federal courts to hear a suit against a State, notwithstanding the latter’s assertion of
sovereign immunity.91 The country reacted to this holding swiftly and extremely.
The very next day, Congress began designing a constitutional amendment that would
overthrow the Chisholm decision.92 The States, moreover, were equally outraged.93
To amplify the point, the Court quoted one scholar’s findings that Georgia’s House
of Representatives passed a bill that made it a crime for anyone to attempt to enforce
the Chisholm decision; those who did, would “‘suffer death, without benefit of
clergy, by being hanged.’” 94 The country’s reaction to the Chisholm decision, the
86
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). Section 216(b) sets forth the following
jurisdictional grant: “An action to recover the liability . . . may be maintained against any
employer (including a public agency) in any federal or state court of competent jurisdiction by
any one or more employees.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Law. Co-op. 1999).
87
See Alden, 527 U.S. at 715. The Tenth Amendment, for example, reserves to the States
those powers that are not prohibited by the Constitution nor delegated to the federal
government; Article IV, § 3, prohibits the involuntary modification of a State’s territory; and
Article V permits the States to amend the Constitution by a three fourths vote. State
sovereignty, moreover, is also implicit in the very notion of a federal government of limited
and enumerated powers. Id.
88

Id. at 729. See also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).

89

Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793).

90

See Alden, 527 U.S. at 717-24.

91

See id. at 719.

92

See id. at 720-24 (citing DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION
FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789-1801, 196 (1997)).

IN

CONGRESS: THE

93

See Alden, 527 U.S. at 720-21.

94

The dissent, however, responded in kind, arguing that Georgia’s reaction was an
aberration, and that even the “author on whom the Court relies has [said that] ‘there was no
unanimity among the Framers that immunity would exist.’” Id. at 793.
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Alden Court thus concluded, underscores the settled doctrinal understanding that the
Constitution in general, and the Tenth Amendment in particular, implicitly
recognizes the States’ sovereign immunity.95
Thus freed from the restrictive language of the Eleventh Amendment, the Court
proceeded to imply meaning from historical silence—a perilous endeavor indeed.96
Nothing in the Constitution suggests that the States are not immune from suit in their
own courts; and although neither the ratification debates nor the Eleventh
Amendment address this issue, no discussion was necessary. Everyone just assumed
that the Constitution did not alter this fundamental and well-entrenched right.97 This
right, the Court believed, is apparent when one considers the backdrop against which
the Constitution and the Eleventh Amendment were adopted.98 The States were on
the brink of insolvency.99 They could not discharge their wartime debts, and thus
understandably feared raids on their state treasuries, an inevitable result if the States
were amenable to suit in any court.100 Moreover, during the congressional debates on
the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, the House of Representatives outright
rejected a proposal that would have left open the federal courts while the state courts
were closed.101 Implicit in this proposal, the Court surmised, is the “evident . . .
premise that the States retained their immunity and the concomitant authority to
decide whether to allow private suits against the sovereign in their own courts.”102
Prolonged congressional inaction, the Court continued, further accentuates the
point.103 For nearly 200 years, Congress has not required the state courts to entertain
federal suits, but it has permitted them to do so since 1789.104 Indeed, the FLSA is
among the first generation of statutes that purports to subject the States to suit in
their own courts.105 Thus Congress’s prolonged inaction in enacting any such
obligatory statutes, the Court concluded, also “suggests an assumed absence of such
95

See id. at 713-15, 722-26.

96

See id; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism: The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV.
1509, 1522 (1998) (“Debating history or general background surrounding the Constitution
adds context that is substantively slanted, not just toward the value of federalism in ways that
the Reconstruction Amendments sought to offset, but also systematically against the interests
of people of color (constitutional slaves in 1789), women (legal servants), poor people
(nonvoters), and religious and social nonconformists (social outcasts), in ways that subsequent
amendments and judicial constructions have sought to ameliorate.”).
97

See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 740-46 (1999).

98

See id.

99

See id. at 750.

100

See id. at 720-22, 741.

101

See id. at 720-22. See also CURRIE, supra note 92, at 196-97.

102

Alden, 527 U.S. at 743.

103

See id. at 743-44.

104

In fact, not until 1875 could the inferior federal courts adjudicate federal question
claims. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470; FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE
BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 64-68 (1927).
105

See Alden, 527 U.S. at 744.
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power.”106 So based on the Framers’ silence, the Constitution’s silence, the Eleventh
Amendment’s silence and Congress’s prolonged inaction, the Court held that
sovereign immunity is constitutionally cognizable in a State’s own courts.107
D. The Tenth Amendment vs. The Supremacy Clause
Obviously, there is virtually no substance to the Court’s opinion. It is largely, if
not entirely, based on what the Constitution and its elusive history do not say. At
most, all that Alden does say is that a State is constitutionally immune from suit in its
own courts if the private right of action is brought under Article I. To test the
validity of this holding, and thereby extract its underlying logic, the next section of
this article examines the problem under an entirely different and, I think, more
principled lens. Somewhat surprisingly, the Court’s holding holds up.
Read literally, the Tenth Amendment108 says that all powers, regardless of their
origin, are allocated among the governments and the people in the following order:
(1) to the federal government to the extent provided in the Constitution; (2) to the
people to the extent the Constitution prohibits giving such powers to the States; and
then (3) to the States to the extent such powers have not already been delegated.
Thus understood, the Tenth Amendment serves as a jurisdictional filter, albeit an
imprecise one. All powers, regardless of their origin, are allocated among the federal
government, the people and the States in accordance with the above formula. For
example, by applying this formula, it becomes clear that the power over speech is
placed in the peoples’ hands.109 This is because the First Amendment prohibits
Congress from abridging the freedom of speech or the press,110 and the Fourteenth
Amendment likewise prohibits the States from doing the same.111 So the power over

106

Id. (quoting Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 907-08 (1997)).

107

See Alden, 527 U.S. at 711.

108

The actual text of the Tenth Amendment reads more succinctly as follows: “The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.
109
Of course I am not suggesting, though others have, see, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of
California, 366 U.S. 36, 60-61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing for an absolutist view of
the First Amendment), that the people’s power over speech is always immune from
governmental intrusion. But the Tenth Amendment should be the starting point. Indeed, the
permissible extent of the government’s intrusion should depend on the extent the
Constitution’s remaining provisions are or are not in accord with the result achieved under the
Tenth Amendment. For example, national security concerns may enable the federal
government to impose restrictions on speech that the First Amendment would otherwise
protect. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 511 n.3 (1980) (“[E]ven in the absence of
an express agreement—the CIA could have acted to protect substantial government interests
by imposing reasonable restrictions on employee activities that in other contexts might be
protected by the First Amendment.”).
110

Since freedom of speech is not an enumerated power, the result would have been the
same even if the First Amendment did not exist.
111
See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (opining that “freedom of speech
and of the press . . . are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States”).
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speech, in other words, only gets us to step two before it is then allocated to the
people.
But in the sovereign immunity context, the result is less clear, not because of
what the Constitution does not say, but because of what it does say. The text of the
Constitution says nothing about sovereign immunity. It does not say whether the
federal government is or is not vested with this power. Nor does it say whether the
States are prohibited from exercising this power. Therefore, from a purely textual
perspective, the Tenth Amendment vests the sovereign immunity power in the States.
Yet such a conclusion is far from clear because other constitutional provisions seem
to counteract this state-court-sovereign-immunity presumption. Take the Supremacy
Clause, for example. It says that the “Judges in every State shall be bound” by the
U.S. Constitution and all of the federal laws that are “made . . . Pursuan[t]” to the
Constitution, “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.” 112 Thus by constitutionalizing the States’ sovereign immunity, the
Alden Court created a standoff that it only partially resolved. If the FLSA is
constitutional, as Garcia has and continues to hold, the state judges are bound by it.
However, the state judges are also bound by the Constitution, which now recognizes
the States’ sovereign immunity.113
Perhaps one way of breaking this deadlock is to default in favor of the States’
sovereign immunity. After all, state court sovereign immunity, unlike the FLSA, is
now inherent in the Constitution itself, and whenever a statute is invalidated, the
Constitution implicitly prevails. National League of Cities v. Usery114 is a case in
point. There, the Tenth Amendment prevailed over a statute Congress enacted under
the Commerce Clause. But alas, in that case the Court found that the Commerce
Power itself did not extend so far; it had not been “made” pursuant to the
Constitution, and so it had never achieved “supreme” status.115
Alden, however, is of a different order. The FLSA’s overtime provision was
plainly “made” in accordance with the Constitution. Not only does Garcia say so,
but the probation officers also conceded the point.116 So does it follow that the
FLSA’s jurisdictional grant was also “made” in accordance with the Constitution? If
so, there is no textually apparent reason why the state courts would not be obligated
to hear the case. The law would then have achieved “supreme” status, and nothing in
the Constitution could have plausibly countered this effect. But since the Court did
not overrule Garcia, but nevertheless upheld the States’ state-court-sovereignimmunity, the Court—for the first time in its history—disconnected Congress’s
power to provide a forum from its power to provide a right. No one (that is, until
now) would have doubted Congress’s power to provide some forum, if the right
sought to be adjudicated was properly within Congress’s regulatory power. But by
112

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

113

Although, at the outset, the Court in Alden simply glossed over the Supremacy Clause,
stating that it simply begs the constitutionality question, later the Court did consider it,
however so cryptically in connection with Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). The actual
holding in Testa is explored extensively below.
114

426 U.S. 833 (1976).

115

See id. at 844-53.

116

See Alden, 527 U.S. at 808-10 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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constitutionalizing the States’ sovereign immunity, the Court unavoidably drove a
wedge between Congress’s power to regulate the States’ intrastate activities and its
power to provide (at least) a private right of action to enforce the same.
Such a far-reaching departure from the past, one would imagine, would not be
achieved inferentially; yet that is the sine qua non of the Court’s holding. An
attentive examination of the constitutionality of the FLSA’s jurisdictional grant is
thus sorely needed, for if it alone is constitutional, the Court’s loose holding in Alden
substantively falls apart.
One way to determine this is to ask whether the constitutionality of the
jurisdictional grant necessarily trains on the constitutionality of the statute’s
substantive right. Put differently, is the constitutionality of a statute’s substantive
and jurisdictional grants coextensive with one another?117 Chief Justice Marshall
thought so. In Cohens v. Virginia,118 after being convicted in state court for violating
a Virginia law that prohibited selling lottery tickets, the defendants appealed to the
Supreme Court, arguing that the Supremacy Clause immunized their conduct
because a District of Columbia law authorized the ticket sales in the State of
Virginia. Chief Justice Marshall first addressed the Court’s jurisdiction: “If any
proposition may be considered . . . a political axiom, this, we think, may be so
considered[:] that the judicial power of every well constituted government must be
co-extensive with the legislative, and must be capable of deciding every judicial
question which grows out of the constitution and laws.”119 The Court then rejected
the State’s immunity defense, holding that (at least insofar as writs of errors are
concerned) the Eleventh Amendment does not apply, but affirmed the State’s
conviction nonetheless.120
This “coextensive axiom” is inapposite. Even if it springs from the Constitution,
the FLSA’s jurisdictional grant may still be unconstitutional because, to quote
Hamilton, there exists “a constitutional method of giving efficacy to [the FLSA’s]
provisions.”121 As the Court in Alden made somewhat clear,122 absent the State’s
117
Though analytically related, this question is unlike the theory of “protective
jurisdiction” in two respects. First, the jurisdictional grant at issue in Alden is tied to a
substantive federal right; and second, the issue here is whether that jurisdictional grant
obligates the state courts, not the federal courts, to adjudicate the substantive claim. For a
general discussion of the variant theories of protective jurisdiction, see Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 469-84 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); RICHARD H.
FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 898907 (1996). The Supreme Court has never explicitly adopted this theory. See, e.g., Mesa v.
California, 489 U.S. 121, 137 (1989) (seeing no need to adopt it). See also 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (rejecting on First Amendment grounds the
“greater-includes-the-lesser” argument).
118

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 376 (1821).

119

Id. at 384.

120

See Cohens, 19 U.S. at 406-12, 448. Chief Justice Marshall reaffirmed this principle in
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 818 (1924) (“The executive department may
constitutionally execute every law which the Legislature may constitutionally make, and the
judicial department may receive from the Legislature the power of construing every such
law.”).
121

THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in FALLON, supra note 117, at

21-23.
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consent, there remains one, perhaps two, ways an employee can still recover back
pay from his state employer. The State may still be brought to book indirectly
through a suit brought by the Secretary of Labor;123 and it may also be possible for
the employee to simply bring an action against the State in a neighboring state
court.124 Thus every substantive right the FLSA gives, the federal courts, at a
minimum, may adjudicate. Whether the former may be brought in the States’ own
courts, or whether the latter may be brought at all, the Court did not say. What is
important, at least at this point, is the constitutionality of the FLSA’s jurisdictional
grant—an inquiry that Chief Justice Marshall’s “coextensive axiom” simply does not
resolve.
Rather than asking whether the constitutionality of Congress’s power to confer
jurisdiction trains (or is included within) Congress’s power to substantively legislate,
another approach may be to ask whether the jurisdictional grant is itself a “law”
within the meaning of the Supremacy Clause. While no authority lies directly on this
point, the Court’s interpretation of the term “law”—for purposes of Article III—may
cast some discerning light on how the Court would interpret the term “law” for
purposes of the Supremacy Clause. Both provisions, after all, contain the phrase
“the laws of the United States.”
Here again, Chief Justice Marshall begins but does not end our analysis. Osborn
v. Bank of the United States125 is, to be sure, a fixed star in the Court’s “arising
under” firmament. The Bank of the United States brought an action in federal court
to enjoin one Ralph Osborn, a state auditor, from levying and collecting an
unconstitutional state tax.126 Hypothesizing on the facts of a companion case,127 the

122

See Alden, 527 U.S. at 756-57.

123

See 29 U.S.C. § 216(c).

124

See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979) (holding that a State is not immune from a
state law claim that is brought in another State’s courts). In Alden, the Court reaffirmed its
holding in Nevada, without so much as mentioning the state law character of that case, and for
good reason. Were the Court to distinguish Nevada on the basis of its “font of the law”—that
is, on the basis that that suit concerned a state, rather than a federal, law—it would have
opened Pandora’s box. According to the Eleventh Amendment, the federal courts are
incapable of adjudicating any suit that is brought against a non-consenting State by a
“Citizen[] of another State.” Since the lower federal courts were incapable of hearing federal
question claims until 1875, state law necessarily filled up much of what the Eleventh
Amendment was initially all about. So to even suggest that sovereign immunity, in any of its
forms, is predicated on the existence of a federal claim would be tantamount to overruling
everything except Chisholm, the case that unquestionably triggered the adoption of the
Eleventh Amendment in the first place! Thus, so long as personal jurisdiction and venue exist,
it seems inconceivable, on this basis alone, to deny an employee the opportunity to sue his
State on a federal question claim, if that claim is filed in a sister State’s courts. In fact, as the
discussion below demonstrates, when a federal question is at issue, the sister state court may
not have any choice in matter.
125

22 U.S. 738 (1824).

126

See id. at 739-42. Several years earlier, the Court held that Congress has the power to
establish a national bank, and that the States do not have the power to tax it. See McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
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Court concluded that the Bank could have brought a garden variety breach of
contract action in federal court because the case would necessarily involve the
adjudication of a federal “ingredient,” namely, the Bank’s capacity to acquire
property, to enter into contracts, and to sue and be sued thereunder.128 Osborn’s
“federal ingredient” theory thus defines the outer limits of what constitutes the “laws
of the United States” for purposes of Article III jurisdiction.129 But could a
jurisdictional grant constitute a “federal ingredient”?
Although at least one commentator has suggested that a jurisdictional grant is
itself an Article III “law,” so long as some national interest is at stake,130 the
orthodox and, indeed, overwhelmingly persuasive view rejects this proposition. In
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,131 a breach of contract action, a Dutch
corporation sued an arm of the Government of Nigeria in federal court. Although the
district court had neither diversity nor statutory federal question jurisdiction,132 the
Court found the presence of a federal “law,” nonetheless. Contrary to two of its prior
decisions133 that “rejected the view that the jurisdictional statute itself constituted . . .

127

See Bank of the United States v. Planters’ Bank of Ga., 22 U.S. 904 (1824). Because the
Bank sought to enjoin the collection of an unconstitutional state tax, the Court in Osborn, at
least under today’s view, was well within the limits of Article III.
128

See id. at 824-25.

129

Actually, the Court slightly extended this holding in the Pacific Removal Cases (Texas
& P.Ry. v. Kirk), 115 U.S. 1 (1885), by holding that a suit brought by or against a federally
chartered railroad, regardless of its nature, was a “law of the United States” within the
meaning of Article III. That this case was, indeed, a “sport,” (see Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at
481 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)), is apparent when one considers the Court’s effort in
lobbying Congress to “nullify its own decision in the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases.”
Frankfuter & Landis, supra note 104, at 272-73. Congress agreed and enacted what is now 28
U.S.C. § 1349, which eliminates federal question jurisdiction based solely on the existence of
a federal charter that establishes the juridical existence of one of the parties, unless the United
States owns a majority of that party’s capital stock. While this statute significantly pares back
the application of the federal ingredient doctrine, that doctrine continues to define the “laws of
the United States” for purposes of Article III. But see American Nat’l Red Cross v. S.G. &
A.E., 505 U.S. 247, 255 (1992) (slighting the effect of § 1349 and potentially limiting the
scope of Article III’s arising under jurisdiction to federal charters that “specifically mention[]
the federal courts.”).
130
See Louise Weinberg, The Power of Congress over Courts in Nonfederal Cases, 1995
BYU L. REV. 731, 803 (1995) (“The widely-held view endorsed by the Court in Mesa and
Verlinden—that federal jurisdiction cannot constitutionally ‘arise under’ a purely
jurisdictional statute—is a fallacy.”).
131

461 U.S. 480, 483 (1983).

132

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1331, respectively. Diversity jurisdiction did not exist because
the case did not involve “a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States” under Article III;
and statutory federal question jurisdiction did not exist because a federal question did not
appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 491-92, 494.
133
See Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. 12, 14 (1800); Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh,
53 U.S. 443, 451-53 (1851).
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‘arising under’ jurisdiction,” the Court held that the statute in question in this case 134
“necessarily raises questions of substantive federal law.”135
Now it is true that the statute at issue in Verlinden arguably did not create any
substantive federal rights; yet however specious the Court’s assertion—that a federal
law did in fact exist—is, this defect in the Court’s holding is not relevant for our
purposes. The FLSA does confer a substantive federal right. The important point
Verlinden provides is that the Court interpreted its prior decisions as rejecting the
idea that a jurisdictional grant is itself a “law” within the meaning of Article III. And
if there remains any doubt on this point, one need only turn to Justice O’Connor,
who has said that a “pure jurisdictional statute[] which seek[s] to do nothing more
than grant jurisdiction over a particular class of cases cannot support Art. III ‘arising
under jurisdiction.’”136
So it seems clear that the FLSA’s jurisdictional grant is not an Article III “law,”
and given the Tenth Amendment’s presumptive finding in favor of the States
retaining the sovereign immunity power, it seems almost equally clear that the
FLSA’s jurisdictional grant is not a “law” under the Supremacy Clause. But there is
more. A congressional enactment is not supreme nor, for that matter, is it even valid
if it is not in accord with Congress’s enumerated powers. In fact, such a law is by
definition “an usurpation of power.”137 Yet there is one enumerated power that calls
for pause. According to Article I, § 8, “Congress shall have [the] Power . . . To
constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court.”138 Thus, it might be argued that
this provision, as augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause,139 somehow arms
Congress with the power to impose jurisdiction on the state courts; and that by doing
so, Congress has made a “law” pursuant to one of its enumerated powers. Such a
view, however, does not wash, for it is manifestly at odds with the Court’s prior
holdings, and it is inconsistent with the interrelated structure of Articles I and III.
Congress need not create any inferior courts—or at least that is what Article III,
§ 1, says.140 Instead, Congress may create so-called “legislative courts” whose

134

See 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (2000).

135

See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 493, 496.

136

Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989). See also Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 47374 (Frankfurter, J. dissenting) (chiding an application of protective jurisdiction that would
“construe[] ‘laws’ to include jurisdictional statutes where Congress could have legislated
substantively in a field.”).
137

THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton).

138

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.

139

Id.

140

Whether all or at least some of Article III’s original and appellate jurisdiction must be
vested in an Article III court(s) has been hotly contested ever since Justice Story’s seminal
opinion in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 328-36 (1816). For an exhaustive
contemporary argument that draws on Justice Story’s view that only certain Article III
jurisdictional tiers must be vested in an Article III court(s), see Akhil Reed Amar, A NeoFederalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L.
REV. 205 (1985); see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction
of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362-66, 1371-74 (1953).
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jurisdictional authority might extend beyond the limits of Article III. In fact when it
comes to legislative courts, Congress has never felt constrained by Article III.141 In
1823, for example, Congress enacted a law that greatly fortified Florida’s territorial
government.142 Not only did this law empower the territorial council to pass all laws
over “all rightful objects of legislation,” but it also authorized the territorial courts to
hear “all civil cases arising under . . . the laws . . . which may at any time be enacted
by the legislative council.”143 By thus conferring general jurisdiction, this statute
obviously exceeded the scope of Article III. But in American Insurance Co. v.
Canter,144 Chief Justice Marshall nonetheless upheld the constitutionality of this
statute because these territorial courts were not Article III courts; they were so-called
“legislative courts.” Hence since at least 1823, it has been apparently145 established
that a jurisdictional grant may constitutionally exceed the scope of Article III. But
would the “judicial power” under Article III open up to accommodate the full scope
of these territorial courts’ jurisdiction?
A majority of the Court in National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer
Co., Inc.,146 took the position that it could not, although one would be hard pressed to
find that holding in Justice Jackson’s plurality opinion. In this case, the Court
upheld a district court’s diversity jurisdiction over a suit brought by a District of
Columbia citizen against a citizen of Maryland, even though the Court had
previously held147 (and did not overrule its holding) that the District of Columbia is

Despite the permissive language of Article III, § 1, this article accepts this portion of Justice
Story’s position.
141

Congress may have enacted a general jurisdictional grant as early as 1787. See CURRIE,
supra note 11, at 104 (finding that the First Congress “adapt[ed]” the Northwest Ordinance,
which, in turn, authorized the creation of a three-judge panel that, in conjunction with an
appointed Governor, would “adopt ‘such laws of the original States, criminal and civil, as may
be necessary and best suited to the circumstances of the district’”); Capital Traction Co. v.
Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 6 (1899) (explaining that this congressional enactment authorized “judicial
proceedings according to the course of the common law.”).
142

Act Cong. 1823, § 5, 3 St. at Large, p. 751 (cited in American Insurance Co. v. Canter,
26 U.S. 511 (1828)).
143

Canter, 26 U.S. at 546.

144

Id.

145

The conclusion of this issue, however, is open to some debate. See Paul Bator, The
Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts Under Article III, 65 IND.
L.J. 233, 252 n.62 (1990), (raising without resolving the issue). For example, it may be
possible to treat the legislative grant as a de facto federalization of all of the laws the
territory’s legislature subsequently enacted. Although possible, it is improbable. The Court in
Canter seemed to assume that this did not happen. There, the issue concerned a territorial
court’s capacity to exercise exclusive Article III admiralty jurisdiction, not “arising under”
jurisdiction. See Canter, 26 U.S. at 546. (holding that the territorial court was competent to
adjudicate this claim because the Article III exclusivity “limitation does not extend to the
territories.”) But since the resolution of this issue—that is, whether Article III cabins a
legislative court’s jurisdiction—is unclear, both sides of this argument are considered.
146

337 U.S. 582 (1949).

147

See Hepburn & Dundas v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. 445 (1805).
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not a “State” within the meaning of Article III.148 In order to get there, however,
Justice Jackson’s opinion, joined by only two other Justices, took the position that
Congress could—and in this case did—expand the district court’s jurisdiction
beyond the limits of Article III.149 The other six Justices, however, flatly rejected
this “dangerous doctrine.”150 Justice Frankfurter profoundly pressed the point: “It
was because Article III defines and confines the limits of jurisdiction of the courts
which are established under Article III that the first Court of Claims Act fell.”151 To
this day, a majority of the Court has never agreed with Justice Jackson’s opinion.
Thus by combining Canter and Tidewater, one rule seems to emerge: Article III
caps an Article III152 but not a legislative court’s jurisdiction.153 Applying this rule, it
might appear that the state courts in Alden were required to hear that case. After all,
the state courts are not Article III courts, and Article I permits Congress to
“constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court.” Consequently, it might be
argued that the FLSA’s jurisdictional grant converts the state courts into legislative
courts, at least with respect to the FLSA’s substantive provisions. In that event, there
would be no need to consider whether the jurisdictional grant is a “law” under the
Supremacy Clause because it only created the state court’s legislative existence. All
that would then remain would be a federal question claim in a court that is not bound
by the limits of Article III. The state legislative courts could thus entertain the
action, even though the Article III courts could not.
However, coming full circle, one could again argue that the FLSA’s substantive
and jurisdictional grants are not constitutional; according to Osborn, Verlinden, and
Mesa, only the substantive grant is. While this is true, there is another, more
definitive reason why this argument is empty. The Court has consistently held that
the Constitute Tribunals Clause is limited to the creation of Article III courts: “The
power given Congress in Art. I, § 8, cl. 9, ‘To constitute Tribunals inferior to the
Supreme Court,’ plainly relates to the ‘inferior Courts’ provided for in Art. III, § 1; it

148

See Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 583-603.

149

See id. at 603-04.

150

See Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 626 (Rutledge, J., concurring in result). Only Justices
Rutledge and Murphy believed that the District of Columbia was a “State” under Article III’s
Diversity Clause, and only Justices Jackson, Black, and Burton believed that Congress could
use its Article I powers to expand the jurisdictional limits of Article III. So even though six of
the nine Justices took the position that Congress could not use Article I to expand Article III,
Justice Jackson’s plurality opinion says that it can.
151

Id. at 652.

152

Chief Justice Marshall is in accord: Article III is “that pure fountain from which all the
jurisdiction of the Federal Courts is derived.” Canter, 26 U.S. at 545.
153

The Bankruptcy and Tax Courts are typically called “Article I courts” because they
were, predictably enough, enacted under Article I. But not all legislative courts are Article I
courts. The territorial courts in Canter, for example, were enacted under either the federal
government’s “general right of sovereignty” or, more likely, Article IV. Thus to use the term
“Article I” in the generic sense is not only misleading. It is also a misnomer. Although the
phrase (à la Chief Justice Marshall) “legislative courts” is more confusing, it is clearly the
more accurate of the two.
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has never been relied on for the establishment of any other tribunals.”154 Indeed the
territorial courts in Canter, for example, were created under either Congress’s
“general right of sovereignty,” or its Article IV power to “make all needful rules and
regulations, respecting the territory belonging to the United States.”155
That the Constitute Tribunals Clause carries the inherent power to establish
legislative courts is also inconsistent with Tidewater, not the mention the interrelated
structure of Articles I and III. If the Constitutes Tribunals Clause could constitute a
legislative court, the latter would necessarily be “inferior to the Supreme Court.”
Yet for that to happen, the legislative court’s jurisdictional capacity would have to be
at least as restrictive as the Supreme Court’s original and appellate jurisdiction. But
Tidewater teaches us that the Supreme Court could not review this case because its
jurisdiction is subject to Article III, and Article III does not cover this case. Thus the
state legislative courts’ holdings would be beyond the Supreme Court’s reviewing
capacity. So in what sense, then, would the state legislative courts be “inferior” to
the Supreme Court? Because a state legislative court is not an “inferior Tribunal,” at
least to the extent that its jurisdiction exceeds the scope of Article III, the state courts
in Alden were not legislative courts.156
Yet perhaps Congress has never conferred more jurisdiction than Article III
permits. It might be argued that Canter is akin to Osborn, in that the Territory’s very
existence was dependent on a federal statute, and thus its capacity to govern
constituted the federal ingredient at issue. However, this proposition is doubtful. In
Canter, the Court held that even though the territorial courts were not Article III
courts, they could nevertheless exercise jurisdiction over an admiralty claim that,
according to Article III, could only be adjudicated in an Article III court.157 Chief
Justice Marshall based this holding on the theory that the legislative courts “could
not receive” the Article III judicial powers, and were thus not subject to Article III’s
exclusivity limitation.158 Although the Court may have subsequently repudiated this
“theological” approach,159 its supposition that the territorial court’s jurisdiction

154

Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543 (1962) (holding that the Court of Claims and
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are Article III courts). Legislative courts have been
enacted under a number of other provisions, however. See, e.g., Kendall v. United States, 37
U.S. 524, 619 (1838) (upholding the creation of legislative courts in the District of Columbia
under Article I, § 8, cl. 17); Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Commr., 358 F.2d 636 (5th Cir.
1966), certiorari denied 385 U.S. 918 (upholding the creation of the Board of Tax Appeals
under Article I, § 8, cl. 1); Northern Pipe Construction v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982) (rejecting an argument that Article I, § 8, cl. 4 authorized Congress to enact the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978).
155

Canter, 26 U.S. at 546.

156

The Alden Court has at least intimated that it is in accord. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 753
(“[A]rticle [III] in no way suggests, however, that state courts may be required to assume
jurisdiction that could not be vested in the federal courts.”) This is no doubt correct; as more
fully fleshed out below, Congress cannot “require” the state courts to assume jurisdiction over
any federal claim.
157

See Canter, 26 U.S. at 546.

158

Id.
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exceeded the scope of Article III has never been doubted. Moreover, if the federal
statute that created the Territory’s legislature federalized all of the Territory’s laws,
there would have been no reason for the Court to consider the justiciability of this
admiralty limitation in the first place.
This is no doubt an “abstruse issue,”160 and one that may still need to be resolved,
but it only proves the point all the more. If Article III caps both the Article III and
the legislative courts’ jurisdictional capacity, then the state courts could never wear
their “legislative” hats to adjudicate a Commerce Clause private right of action
against their own non-consenting State. According to Seminole Tribe,161 those
claims are outside the scope of Article III, and therefore outside the scope of the state
legislative court’s jurisdiction.162
At this point, if just one hardened rule has emerged it is this: A jurisdictional
grant is not a “law” within the meaning of the Supremacy Clause. So it would
appear that there is a partially symmetrical relationship between an Article III “law”
and an Article VI “law.”
The Court in Alden also looked to Article III, although not to interpret what a law
is, but to confine the possible obligations that could be imposed on the state courts.163
This exposes the key to the Court’s dilemma. At one point in the opinion, the Court
brushed off the Supremacy Clause as if it was utterly beside the point.164 The
Supremacy Clause, the Court quipped, merely begs the question of whether the law
is itself constitutional.165 As a textual matter this is true, but then the Court never
analyzed whether the jurisdictional grant—the very law (or at least piece of the law)
that it ultimately invalidated—was constitutional.
Instead, the Court, not
surprisingly, silently invalidated the FLSA’s jurisdictional grant. First, the Court put
a good face on the standoff, holding that even though a constitutionally enacted
substantive right is the supreme law of the land, it does not follow that the State’s
constitutionally based immunity defense must yield.166 Then much later, after it had
well established the absence of any prohibitory precedent, the Court came back to
159

See Bator, supra note 145, at 242-43. But see Collins, Article III Cases, State Courts
Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 156 (1995) (demonstrating
persuasively from a historical perspective that the state courts are “incapable of receiving” any
jurisdiction from Congress because their jurisdictional power is “granted to them as a matter
of state law.”) Professor Collins’s historical findings are fully consistent with this Article’s
analytical conclusions, namely, that only the States can define their own courts’ jurisdiction.
160

See Bator, supra note 145, at n.62.

161

517 U.S. 44 (1996).

162

At the cusp of the Court’s sovereign immunity spree, one commentator argued that state
courts could wear both hats. See Saikrishna B. Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L.
REV. 1957, 1961 (1993). Besides the arguments made thus far, however, it appears that this
conclusion is based on “spotty” historical findings. See Michael G. Collins, Article III, Cases,
State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 137-39 (1995).
163

See Alden, 572 U.S. at 706.

164

Indeed, the Court devoted less than one page of its lengthy opinion to an analysis of
both the Supremacy Clause and the Tenth Amendment. See Alden, 572 U.S. at 713, 753.
165

Id.

166

Id.
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the Supremacy Clause and delivered the definitive ispe dixit: “The Supremacy
Clause does impose specific obligations on state judges. There can be no serious
contention, however, that the Supremacy Clause imposes greater obligations on
state-court judges than on the Judiciary of the United States itself.”167 There can be
no serious doubt about the first assertion, but the second is merely a cobbled attempt
to avoid overruling Testa sub silentio.168 While it is unclear whether the Court has
done that, the discussion that follows demonstrates that the Court should not overrule
Testa because it is entirely consistent with Alden’s holding.
E. Employees of Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare vs. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare
Thus far, it would appear that Testa presents a heavy counterweight to Alden’s
holding. Justice Thurgood Marshall thought so, but he was mistaken. The Court in
fact broached this exact issue in Employees of Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare v.
Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare.169 Yet however tempting, the Court wisely resisted
resolving it because this case had nothing to do with state-court-sovereignimmunity.170 Rather, it considered whether a Missouri citizen could bring an FLSA
action against the State of Missouri in federal—not state—court.
In concurring with the majority’s holding, Justice Marshall disagreed with the
majority in all respects, save one: that the State of Missouri did not implicitly
consent to federal jurisdiction.171 Justice Marshall agreed with the dissenting opinion
in two particulars: that a State’s immunity from suit derives not from the
Constitution but from the common law; and that Congress attempted to lift the
State’s sovereign immunity.172 But Justice Marshall also believed that attempt was
ineffective because Article III strips the federal courts of jurisdiction whether a noncitizen brought the suit or not.173 Thus, Justice Marshall sided with the majority’s
holding that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction.174
167

Id. at 753 (emphasis added).

168

Even worse than the Court’s Supremacy Clause discussion, both the majority and the
dissent devoted a combined total of less than one sentence to Testa, the case that Justice
Thurgood Marshall believed resolved the exact issue in this case. See Employees of Dep’t of
Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 297-98 (1973)
(Marshall J., concurring). The Court avoided dealing with this apparent conflict, and probably
granted certiorari, because the probation officers failed to raise this and a related waiver issue
in the state trial court. See Brief for Respondent, 1999 WL 66190, at * 41. Although the Court
briefly dealt with the waiver issue, see Alden, 527 U.S. at 737, it nevertheless ignored Testa’s
implications all together.
169

411 U.S. 279, 287 (1973).

170

Id.

171

Id. at 296-97. This aspect of the Court’s holding demonstrates its uneasiness, if not its
open hostility, towards the Court’s prior holding in Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184
(1964), which ruled that Alabama had implicitly waived its sovereign immunity by merely
engaging in interstate commerce.
172

Id. at 288, 289.

173

Id. at 294.

174

This holding—that the FLSA did not evince an unequivocal congressional intent to
abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity—instigated Congress’s 1974 amendments. Two
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However, the absence of federal jurisdiction, Justice Marshall unnecessarily
continued, does not mean that state employees “are without a forum in which
personally to seek redress against the State[:]”
Section 16(b)’s authorization for employee suits to be brought ‘in any
court of competent jurisdiction’ includes state as well as federal courts.
. . . Congress has the power to lift the State’s common-law immunity from
suit insofar as that immunity conflicts with the regulatory authority
conferred upon it by the Commerce Clause. . . . While constitutional
limitations upon the federal judicial power bar a federal court action by
these employees to enforce their rights, the courts of the State nevertheless
have an independent constitutional obligation to entertain employee
actions to enforce those rights. See Testa v. Katt 330 U.S. 386 (1947).175
Since Missouri’s courts were empowered to hear “suits of this character,” and
since federal law stands supreme, the Constitution, Justice Marshall argued, requires
that the state courts “enforce it, even if it conflicts with state policy.”176
Viewed from any angle, however, Testa does not support Justice Marshall’s
obligatory view of state court jurisdiction.177 In fact, as the following analysis amply
demonstrates, Testa actually (and no doubt ironically) supports the en masse
rejection of Justice Marshall’s position.
F. Testa, et al. vs. Katt
Harry Katt sold a car to Alfred Testa in violation of the Emergency Price Control
Act, which pursuant to Congress’s war powers178 imposed price caps on the sale of
certain goods and services. So Testa sued Katt in state court but ultimately lost.179
Since this federal law provided Testa with a triple damages remedy “in any court of
competent jurisdiction,” the state court concluded that it was a penal law and
dismissed the case.180 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and unanimously
reversed.181
Scholars have generally read Testa in one of two ways. Some, relying on the
opinion’s strong Supremacy Clause prose, believe that the Court adopted a broad
years later, however, the Court’s holding in National League of Cities neutralized the effect of
these amendments; and nine years after that, the Court again reversed itself and overruled
National League of Cities in Garcia. See discussion in Part I, infra.
175

Id. at 297-98.

176

Id. at 298.

177

See LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 184 n.45 (1988).

178

See Federal Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, amended by the Stabilization
Extension Act of 1944, 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 925(e); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414
(1944) (upholding the delegation of legislative authority to the Office of Price
Administration); see also David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Second
World War, 1941-1946, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 27-33 (1987).
179

See Testa v. Katt, 47 A.2d 312 (1946).

180

Id. at 313.

181

See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
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view of the state courts’ duty to adjudicate concurrent federal question claims.182
Under this approach, the existence of an analogous state law claim is irrelevant. The
Supremacy Clause imposes an independent obligation on the state courts to exercise
jurisdiction over concurrent federal question claims.183 Relying on the opinion’s last
paragraph, however, other scholars believe that Testa merely reaffirms the Court’s
holding in Mondou.184 According to this view, Congress could require the state
courts to adjudicate concurrent federal claims only if they have jurisdiction over an
analogous state law claim.185 The “fact that both possibilities are conceivable” is no
doubt “a clue that neither is probable.”186 Another clue turns on Justice Frankfurter’s
silence in light of his unshakable belief that a state court’s jurisdiction lies solely in
its creator’s hands.187 It thus seems doubtful that he would stand idly by if he
182

Id.

183

See, e.g., Terrance Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground:
Proposal for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 187, reprinted in THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION 155 (Philip B. Kurland ed. 1975) (arguing for a broad
interpretation); Nicole A. Gordon & Douglas Gross, Justiciability of Federal Claims in State
Court, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145, 1165-71, 1182 (1984). Justice Marshall clearly
subscribed to this view. See Employees of Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. at 29798 (1973) (Marshall J., concurring).
184

See Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 55 (1912). Here, the Court
considered whether a federal statute “may be enforced, as of right, in the courts of the states
when their jurisdiction, as prescribed by local laws, is adequate.” Id. (emphasis added). This
case in no way concerned Congress’s ability to compel the state courts to entertain a federal
claim that was outside the scope of their jurisdiction “as defined by the Constitution and laws
of the state.” Id. (emphasis added) Rather, this case held that once the state courts have
jurisdiction over the matter, the state courts cannot decline to hear the federal claim because
(1) they disagree with the substantive merits of the federal claim (i.e., its “policy”) or (2) they
would be confused or inconvenienced. See id. at 55-56. Before holding that the state courts
could do neither of these, the Court thrice mentioned that “there is not here involved any
attempt by Congress to enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction of [the] state courts.” Id. at 55, 56.
Yet from this opinion somehow arose the notion that the state courts are obligated to enforce
analogous federal claims. This view simply confounds the state courts’ substantive obligation
under the Supremacy Clause with their state-prescribed jurisdictional obligations.
185
See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 117, at 113 n.13 (1988) (eschewing the First Edition’s
narrow view in favor of an ambivalent view); Note, Utilization of State Courts to Enforce
Federal Penal and Criminal Statutes: Development in Judicial Federalism, 60 HARV. L. REV.
966, 971 (1947) (interpreting the holding narrowly).
186

RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 297 (1990).

187
Justice Frankfurter subscribed to the view, consistent with this article, that the state
courts were only compelled—and, indeed, were only empowered—to hear those claims that
were in accord with their State’s legislative mandate. See Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178, 188
(1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Neither Congress nor the British Parliament nor the
Vermont Legislature has power to confer jurisdiction upon the New York courts. But the
jurisdiction conferred upon them by the only authority that has power to create them and to
confer jurisdiction upon them—namely the law-making power of the State of New York—
enables them to enforce rights no matter what the legislative source of the right may be.”)
(emphasis added).
Professor Wechsler believed that Testa’s “final paragraph may have been a concession to
[the] Justices who thought, as Justice Frankfurter did, that there were limits to federal

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss4/5

28

1999]

MR. JUSTICE HOLMES’S CONSTITUTIONALLY CROOKED

525

believed Testa recognized any such federal power. The third and in fact dispositive
clue requires a rigorous analysis of the real issues that were at stake in this case.
Testa casts no cloud over the Court’s previous, and near obsessive, intimations
that Congress cannot alter the jurisdiction of the States’ courts.188 In fact, Testa
practically says so. A careful review of Robinson v. Norato,189 the case upon which
the state court in Testa relied, reveals the key to the Testa decision. Precisely the
same issue was presented in both cases: Are the state courts “without jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case at bar.”190 Tackling that question, the state court
in Robinson worked the syllogism: (1) international law prohibits the enforcement of
the penal laws of another sovereign;191 (2) the States are sovereign and thus cannot
enforce the penal laws of another State;192 (3) the federal government is akin to the
States, and thus its penal laws are not enforceable in the States’ courts;193 and (4) the
Emergency Price Control Act is a penal statute.194 Therefore, the state courts cannot
entertain an action under the Emergency Price Control Act.
In support of its first two premises, the Robinson court cited Wisconsin v. Pelican
Ins., Co.,195 where Justice Gray held that the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction
over a suit to enforce a Wisconsin State Court’s criminal conviction of a Louisiana
citizen. Although the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits brought by a State
against a citizen of another State, the Supreme Court held that it nevertheless could
not entertain jurisdiction over the Louisiana defendant because Louisiana’s courts
did not have jurisdiction over the matter.196 This is so because state courts do not
enforce another State’s penal laws.197 Thus the Supreme Court held, and this is key,
that if it could exercise original jurisdiction, the result would be no different than if
mandates to state courts.” Gordon & Gross, supra note 183, at 1159 n.62. There is surely
more to this opinion than meets the causal eye. A more plausible view, however, is that the
federal courts desperately needed the state courts’ assistance in enforcing this War-time
measure—a measure that essentially federalized state law contracts and certain rental
activities. So the Court hid the ball. See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 359 (1963) (tendering the view that the States did not much like this
statute); see also Robinson v. Norato, 43 A.2d 467, 468 (1945) (opining that the Emergency
Price Control Act “constitute[s] a direct interference with interests in realty and indirectly
affect[s] the incidence of tenure . . . which heretofore have never been considered to be within
the domain of federal power either in peace or war.”).
188

See Gordon & Gross, supra note 183, at 1159 n.169.

189

43 A.2d 467 (R.I. 1945).

190

Id. at 258; Testa, 71 A.2d at 474 (“If, under the established law of Rhode Island, the
act . . . is penal in its nature, must our courts take jurisdiction?”) (emphasis added).
191
See id. at 468 (citing The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825), and, more
importantly, Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888)).
192

See id.

193

See id. at 471 (citing Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876)).

194

See id. at 263.

195

27 U.S. 265 (1888).

196

See id. at 287-89.

197

See id. at 291.
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the defendant’s courts exercised jurisdiction, and that is something they cannot do.
In other words, exercising original jurisdiction in this case would be no different than
requiring the state courts to do the same; the Supreme Court cannot constitutionally
require the state courts to exercise jurisdiction, and so the Supreme Court cannot
exercise its original jurisdiction.198
Since the Pelican case dealt with a state penal statute, the state court in Robinson
needed to find some authority that would extend this rule to the reverse fact
pattern—that is, to a state court applying a federal statute. Although the Robinson
court could find no binding federal authority on this point, Justice Gray again fit the
bill. In Huntington v. Attrill,199 Justice Gray let loose the dictum: “Upon similar
grounds, the courts of a state cannot be compelled to take jurisdiction of a suit to
recover a like penalty for a violation of a law of the United States.”200 This case,
however, had nothing to do with a federal statute,201 but it did pin cite some even
weightier dictum, that of Justice Story in Martin v. Hunters Lessee.202 There, Justice
Story turned today’s orthodox view of the Madisonian Compromise on its head.203
He posited the riddle that has since puzzled scholars and courts alike: Does the
Constitution require that all (or at least some) of Article III’s jurisdictional grants be
vested in the Article III courts? He believed it did because Congress could not
compel the state courts to exercise jurisdiction.204 Later on in this opinion, Justice
Story stated that the Constitution prohibited Congress from permitting the States to
adjudicate the criminal laws of the U.S.205 Justice Gray based his dictum in
Huntington on these last two points. He claimed that a State could not enforce a
federal penal law because (1) Congress cannot impose a jurisdictional obligation on
the state courts; and (2) federal criminal laws could not be adjudicated in the state

198
See id. at 299-300. Now it is true that the Court never explicitly said that accepting
jurisdiction is tantamount to an obligatory expansion of the state court’s jurisdiction, but the
inference is unavoidable. Otherwise, there would be no reason for the Court to have gone to
such great lengths to explain that the state courts are barred from enforcing the penal laws of
another State.
199

146 U.S. 657, 672 (1892).

200

Id. at 672.

201

This case merely concerned the state law enforcement of a New York state court penal
conviction against a Maryland defendant.
202

14 U.S. 304 (1816).

203

See Collins, supra note 159, at 105-35, for an excellent discussion of the Madisonian
Compromise.
204
See Martin, 14 U.S. at 330 (“Congress cannot vest any portion of the judicial power of
the United States, except in courts ordained and established by itself.”). This mandatory
vesting view is gaining in popularity. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of
Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1984); Akhil R. Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating
the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction 65 B. U. L. REV. 205 (1985); Daniel J. Meltzer, The
History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569 (1990).
205

See Martin, 14 U.S. at 337 (“No part of the criminal jurisdiction of the United States
can, consistently with the constitution, be delegated to state tribunals.”).
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courts. The court in Robinson largely based its holding—that the state courts did not
have jurisdiction over the federal penal statute—on Justice Gray’s dictum.206
On appeal, the Supreme Court had to reject one of Justice Gray’s aforementioned
claims. If the Court rejected Justice Gray’s first point, it would have had to overrule
the Pelican case. However, since Justice Gray’s second point was based only on
Justice Story’s dictum, the Court rejected it and left the Pelican case intact. The
Court accomplished this in three steps. First, the Court stated that it was “conceded”
that under the State’s laws, the state court had jurisdiction over this type of claim.207
Then the Court short-circuited the state court’s jurisdictional argument by attacking
its essential premise. The States, the Court held, “do not bear the same relation to
the United States that they do to foreign countries” or sister States.208 Indeed, the
Supremacy Clause rejects this notion. It essentially converts the federal laws into
state laws. That is, “[w]hen Congress . . . adopted th[is] act, it spoke for all the
people and all the states . . . as if the act had emanated from [the States’] own
legislature.”209 So to summarize, at this point the Court had effectively held (1) that
the federal law is treated as if it was a state law; and (2) that the state court had
“conceded” that it has jurisdiction over the state (and therefore the federal) claim.210
Finally, the Court had to reject Justice Story’s second point, that the federal penal
laws cannot be enforced in the State’s courts. To do this, the Court turned to one of
its prior decisions, which merely confirmed the States’ ability—but not their
obligation—to adjudicate federal claims.211 The case was Claflin, where the Court
held that if “an act of Congress give[s] a penalty to a party aggrieved . . . there is no
reason why it should not be enforced . . . in a state court.”212
At bottom, then, the Court never held that the States are obligated to enforce the
federal laws. Rather, the Court only held that a state judge could not substantively
discriminate against a federal law, and that a federal penal law could be adjudicated
in the States’ courts. So for purposes of this article, the real holding in Testa is not
much of a holding at all. It merely reaffirms the Court’s holding in Claflin, that the
“federal laws can[not] be considered by the states as though they were laws
emanating from a foreign sovereign.”213 The Supremacy Clause already said that.
Therefore, the importance of this case lies in the fact that the Court specifically
avoided overruling its holding in the Pelican case, implying at least that Congress
cannot require the States to exercise jurisdiction over any federal claim.

206

See Robinson, 43 A.2d 467 (R.I. 1945).

207

See Testa, 330 U.S. at 394. The Court actually placed this point at the end of its
opinion.
208

Id. at 390.

209

See id. at 392.

210

Id.

211

See Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876).

212

Testa, 330 U.S. at 391 (quoting Claflin, 93 U.S. at 137).

213

Testa, 330 U.S. at 391.
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G. Mr. Justice Holmes’s Jurisdictional Stopgap
Up to this point, it seems clear that a federal jurisdictional grant is not a “law”
within the meaning of the Supremacy Clause, and that the Supreme Court has never
required the States to exercise jurisdiction over any federal claim that was outside the
scope of their States’ state-imposed jurisdictional duties. All that remains is a
coherent and consistent theory that supports this result—enter Mr. Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes. The dissent in Alden welcomed his holding in Kawananakoa v.
Polyblank214 with open arms, referring to it as a “logically impeccable theory” that
no one could “escape from.” 215 Justice Holmes surely would have appreciated these
compliments, but he would not have appreciated the dissent’s misreading of what he
actually said in Kawananakoa.
In that case, after mortgaging their property, the Kawananakoas conveyed a
portion of their property to Damon, who in turn conveyed the property to the
Territory of Hawaii.216 When the Kawananakoas defaulted, the mortgagee
foreclosed on all of the property except the piece the Territory owned, bringing suit
against the Kawananakoas for the deficiency.217 The Kawananakoas argued that they
were only responsible for the deficiency that would persist after all the property was
sold. However, the Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawaii held that that would
require “joining the Territory as a party defendant, and that cannot be done.”218
Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court, affirmed. The correctness of the
lower court’s holding, he philosophized, “has been public property since before the
days of Hobbes. A sovereign is exempt from suit . . . on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends.”219 Since the Territory is itself the “fountain from which
rights ordinarily flow,” if it says it is immune, it is immune.220
Careful reflection reveals that Alden’s dissenters cannot escape Justice Holmes’s
impeccable logic. Now it is true, as the dissent pointed out, that he tied the source of
the immunity to the law upon which it arose; and by way of example, he claimed that
the District of Columbia would be subject to suit in the Circuit Court of the District
of Columbia if a federal statute said so.221 However, that would be true even if a
state law created the right of action upon which the suit in the Circuit Court of the
District of Columbia was based. This is because “there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.”222 The dissent
214

205 U.S. 349 (1907).

215

See Alden, 527 U.S. at 798.

216

See Polyblank v. Kawananakoa, 1905 WL 1418, at * 1 (Haw. Terr. Oct. 23, 1905).

217

See id.

218

See Polyblank, 1905 WL 1418 at * 1.

219

Kawananakoa, 205 U.S. at 353.

220

Id. at 353-54.

221

See Metropolitan R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U.S. 1, 4, 11 (1889) (approvingly
referred to in Kawananakoa, 205 U.S. at 353, 354).
222
Kawananakoa, 205 U.S. at 353 (emphasis added). The precise meaning of this phrase
is only discernible if you keep in mind that a “legal dut[y] is logically antecedent to [a] legal
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assumed that what Justice Holmes meant by “law” was the common law or statute
that created the mortgagee’s right to foreclose. While erroneous, such an assumption
is understandable. As the discussion thus far amply demonstrates, a “law” within the
meaning of both the Supremacy Clause and Article III does not include jurisdictional
grants.
Justice Holmes, however, did not subscribe to such rigid formalities. He looked
at the law backwards. To him, the “law” is a command that tells its recipient what
they cannot do.223 As for the other side of the coin, i.e., the right, it is not always
coextensive with the duty:
To put it more broadly, and avoid the word duty, which is open to
objection, the direct working of the law is to limit freedom of action or
choice on the part of a greater or less number of persons in certain
specified ways; while the power of removing or enforcing this limitation
which is generally confided to certain other private persons, or, in other
words, a right corresponding to the burden, is not a necessary or universal
correlative.224
Kawananakoa is a case in point. If the Territory of Hawaii did not own a piece of
the property at issue in this case, the landowner’s duty would extend as far as the
mortgagee’s right. The mortgagee would have a right to the property, and the owner
would have a duty to give up the property. But since the Territory was involved, the
owners’ duty did not extend as far as the mortgagee’s rights. The private owner was
under a duty to give up the property but the Territory was not; we know this because
the Territory’s right to retain possession of the property was essentially transformed
into a duty imposed on the judge. The judge was under a duty to deny the
mortgagee’s right against the State; and this duty was the “law” Holmes was
referring to in Kawananakoa. Indeed, in his mind, a legal right was secondary, if not
incidental, to the proper functioning of the judicial machine.
Against this backdrop, one can see that Justice Holmes never said that “sovereign
immunity may be invoked only by the sovereign that is the source of the right upon
which suit is brought,” as the dissent stated.225 In fact, he specifically counseled
against looking at the source of the right, as opposed to the source of the duty.226 The
only relevant duty in Kawananakoa was whether the judge should immunize the
Territory of Hawaii, and to determine that required looking at the source of the
right[].” O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 173 (1881). Thus considered, it is apparent
that the right, being dependent on the “law,” only takes hold after a duty is imposed on the
judge to adjudicate the right.
223

See O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 42 168 (1881) (“[t]he purpose of criminal law is
only to induce external conformity to rule . . . [l]aw, being a practical thing, must found itself
on actual forces.”); Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897) (“The
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean
by the law.”).
224

See id. at 173.

225

Alden, 527 U.S. at 796 (emphasis added).

226

See O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 173-74 (1881) (stating that not all rights are
created by the law, and that the law is best understood by looking at the back of its shield—
that is, by looking at its power to restrict persons from using their rights).
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court’s existence, not the “source of the right upon which [the] suit [was]
brought.”227
With this distinction in mind, it thus becomes readily apparent why Justice
Holmes believed a suit against the District of Columbia in the Circuit Court of the
District of Columbia is different than a suit against the Territory of Hawaii in the
Territory’s courts.228 Only a federal jurisdictional grant could (and did) bind the
judge in the former case,229 whereas only a Territory of Hawaii jurisdictional grant
could (and did) bind the judge in the latter case.230 The result would have been the
same regardless of the fountains from which these private rights of action arose.
H. A Synthesis of the Jurisdictional Stopgap Model
Federalism is a complicated mosaic. It is perhaps the most elusive area of our
law, especially in the arcane area of jurisdictional law. Layer upon layer, the Court’s
holdings tug at the consistent limits of the preceding layer; and when you throw the
rich and eloquent history of the constitutional debates into the mix, you sometimes
border on complete confusion. This article has traveled across many of these mine
fields, not through the Framer’s eyes, but through the Court’s holdings that have
crystallized since then. In the process, an odd basic consequent has emerged: the
Constitution does indeed strike a state-federal balance. Both spheres retain “a
residuary and inviolable sovereignty,”231 yet there will unavoidably be some overlap.
The simple solution, and the one the Framers no doubt envisioned, is compromise.
Congress’s Commerce Power extends into virtually every crevice. The Framers may
not have envisioned that result, but the animal cannot be caged. Only common
sense—not hollow formulas—can do that, and the best proxy for common sense is
self interest vis-a-vis the national and state political processes.
The States’ however have plenary power over the jurisdiction of their judiciary.
The Framers must have envisioned that, for they gave Congress the ability to
establish inferior federal courts should the States resist.232 Justice Holmes must have
seen this jurisdictional stopgap, for it is evident in his view of the law: law is a
command; rights are a necessary by-product; and sometimes the power that
commands retains some of these rights. This is the case in the law of jurisdiction.
The courts are dependents, mere appendages, of their sovereign, and as such they
may be destroyed should they refuse “to submit themselves” to their sovereign.233
This is the “public property” Justice Holmes and Hobbes were both well aware of.
Jurisdiction, in other words, is an all or nothing proposition. It can only arise from

227

Id.

228

See Metropolitan R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U.S. 1, 4, 11 (1889) (approvingly
referred to in Kawananakoa, 205 U.S. at 353, 354).
229

See Metropolitan R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U.S. 1, 11 (1889).

230

See Kawananakoa, 205 U.S. at 354.

231

THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (Alexander Hamilton).

232

See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.

233

HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651), reprinted in LORD LLOYD OF HAMPSTEAD
FREEMAN, LLOYD’S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 151-52 (5th ed. 1985).
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the source of its creation, and thus it is “incapable of receiving” the judicial power
from any other source.
And so it is. Congress may regulate interstate commerce to practically no end,
and it can, nay it must, provide a forum for the vindication of these rights. Although
a citizen may not necessarily bring a federal action against a State in federal court,
the federal government no doubt can. The Supreme Court has never said otherwise.
But bringing these actions is not cheap, nor should they be. The federal government,
after all, is effectively coercing the States to submit to its regulatory policy—a policy
over which the States may not agree; because if they did, they would have consented
to the suit in the first place. As for the remaining federal claims, i.e. those against
private citizens, the federal doors open up without the assistance of the Executive
Branch. These claims, while infringing on the State’s interstitial role as regulator,
are only coercive in the negative sense—that is, they may prohibit the States from
occupying the field. The States may of course disagree with these laws, and
accordingly close their doors.234 Should that happen, the drain on (and thus the
continued expansion of) the federal judiciary may be significant. But it should be. If
all of the States disagree with the federal law, it just might be a bad idea. To coerce
the States into enforcing a law they disagree with is to encourage its de facto
nullification. Most of the state judges, after all, are elected. Moreover, to require
state judges to do that which their very existence is against unquestionably
constitutes a failing in the state political process, not to mention a drain on the other
laboratory experiments that may be brewing.235
Simply because the federal government cannot coerce the state courts directly,
however, does not mean that it cannot effectively do so indirectly. It can accomplish
its desired result by persuading State legislatures to open up the jurisdiction of their
courts to accommodate a federal claim. Once the state courts have jurisdiction over
the matter, they then cannot refuse to hear the claim, regardless of the existence of an
analogous state law claim.236
I. Conclusion
The Supreme Court tried to save the State’s sovereignty by caging the Commerce
Power. That cannot be done, as National League of Cities woefully demonstrates.
So this time, instead of delimiting the reach of the Commerce Clause, the Court
pared back Congress’s ability to abrogate the States’ immunity from certain suits
filed in the federal courts. This was entirely proper because the very existence of the
federal judiciary is dependent on the federal government, though the Supreme Court,
unlike the state courts, has the power to define its own jurisdiction within the limits

234
It may appear that this jurisdictional stopgap essentially swallows Mondou’s
discrimination model. It doesn’t. Mondou specifically dealt with the court’s discrimination,
not the state legislature. The States can discriminate all they want, but they won’t if what the
federal government has to offer is in accord with what the States’ constituents want.
235
For an excellent discussion of the economics for and against a strong and weak federal
government, see SHAPIRO, supra note 64, at 34-44, 75-91, 118-31 (1995).
236

The requirement that there be an analogous state law claim is really just a circuitous
way of saying that the state court has jurisdiction.
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of Article III.237 The Supreme Court simultaneously reinvigorated cooperative
federalism by rejecting Congress’s ability to coerce and commandeer the legislative
and executive branches. Finally, the Court recognized that the States are at least as
immune from suit in their own courts as they are from suit in the federal courts.
Now all that remains is for the Supreme Court to recognize the last turn in Justice
Holmes’s constitutionally crooked path and begin to move to the measure of his
thoughts.

237

That is, the federal judicial power (or at least a large portion of it) must be vested in
some court. And if the state courts do not have jurisdiction, and if Congress does not confer
that jurisdiction, then the Court must either insist that the inferior federal courts exercise that
jurisdiction or the Court itself must exercise original jurisdiction over the matter. If there are
no inferior federal courts, only the last alternative remains available, as the Court clearly
cannot require Congress to create the inferior courts, for that would be an exercise over the
purse.
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